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Paper No. 1-2004 
Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge 
 
Abstract 
What explanation is there of the source of my justification for my beliefs about my  
beliefs that respects the fact that I am normally the best authority on them?  Moore’s  
paradox demands an explanation of the absurdity of believing or asserting possible truths  
of the forms p but I don’t believe that p or p but I believe that not-p.  I argue for Evans  
principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I  
believe that p.  This helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs and also shows  
that it is impossible for a Moorean belief to be justified.  I then explain the absurdity of  
Moorean assertion while avoiding the messy notion of ‘expressing belief’ yet  
acknowledging Shoemaker’s constraint that if I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I  
cannot non-absurdly assert that p.     
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
I defend a solution to the problem of self-knowledge that at the same time provides a 
solution to Moore’s paradox. The problem of self-knowledge is the problem of 
explaining the source of my justification for my beliefs about my own mental states in a 
way that respects the fact that I am normally the best authority on such states.  Moore’s 
paradox is the problem of explaining why it is absurd of me to believe, or derivatively 
assert, a possible truth of the form p but I don’t believe that p or of the form p but I 
believe that not-p.  After noting important features of both problems in §2 and §3, I show 
in §4 how Shoemaker’s account of Moorean belief although illuminating, nonetheless 
fails.  This points the way towards a principle implicit in the work of Evans, namely that 
whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that 
p.  After arguing for that principle in §5, I show in §6 that it helps explain how I come to 
know my own beliefs.  For it turns out that whenever I come to know that p then I also 
tend to come to believe that I know that p.  In §7 I show how the same principle shows 
that it is impossible to enjoy any justification for a Moorean belief.  In §8 I propose an 
explanation of the absurdity of Moorean assertion that avoids the messy notion of 
‘expressing belief’ and yet respects Shoemaker’s constraint that if I cannot non-absurdly 
believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly assert that p.  I end in §9 by neutralising two 
objections to this proposal.     
 
 
 
 
 
2.  The problem of self-knowledge 
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 My self-knowledge is my knowledge of my own mental states.  These include those that 
are cognitive (such as processes of inference) epistemic (states of knowledge and belief) 
motive (such as desires and wishes) and emotive (such as states of fear and anger). A full 
account of self-knowledge would explain how I know whether or not I am in such states 
as well as how I am acquainted with the qualia or what-it-is-to-be-like-ness of such a 
state when I am in it.  In this paper I will only deal with my knowledge of my own 
beliefs. 
On internalist accounts of knowledge, I know that I believe that p only if I am 
justified in believing that I believe that p.  On externalist accounts of knowledge, I know 
that I believe that p only if I have a truth-tracking belief that I believe that p or in other 
words, a second-order belief that I have acquired by means of a reliable method of 
forming true beliefs.  One family of externalist accounts are elucidated in terms of causal 
connections between my belief that p and my belief that I hold that belief.  Such an 
accounts avoid Getteristic counterexamples in which what makes it the case that p is not 
what tends to make me believe that p.  This is precisely what a causal account of 
knowledge denies.  In terms of knowledge of my own belief, it would hold that what 
makes me believe that p is what tends to make me believe that I believe that p. 
On either type of account, the source of my justification for believing that I hold 
the belief that p seems mysterious. For it is natural to think that my justification for 
believing, say, that that it is raining, is quite different from my justification for thinking 
that I believe that it is raining.  What justifies me in believing that it is raining is often my 
apparent observation of rain.  But what justifies me in believing that I hold the belief that 
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it is raining?  The only answer seems to be introspection of my own beliefs.  On this view 
of the difference, I focus my attention upon the outside world in acquiring justification 
for the belief that it is raining but focus my attention upon my internal mental states in 
acquiring the justification for believing that I hold the belief that it is raining.  On 
externalist accounts of self-knowledge, this method of introspection would have to be a 
truth-tracking or reliable method of acquiring beliefs about my own beliefs about the 
weather. 
This appeal to introspection would have to explain two related features of self-
knowledge.  Firstly, my own justification for ascribing to myself the belief that it is 
raining is unlike your justification for ascribing that belief to me.  Secondly, I am 
normally the best authority on my own beliefs.  The appeal to introspection would claim 
that your justification for thinking that I hold the belief that it is raining consists in your 
observation of my behaviour from which you inductively infer the best explanation that I 
hold that belief.  But my justification for ascribing that belief to myself is not based upon 
observation of my own behaviour, nor upon any form of inference, but upon an inward 
‘perception’ of my own mental states that is normally immune from error. 
 But there are three reasons why self-knowledge should not be thought of in terms  
 
of perception.  Firstly, there is no physical organ of introspection.  Since ‘seeing what 
mental states are inside me’ is metaphorical, the literal description of this faculty remains 
mysterious1. Secondly, the phenomenology of self-knowledge is not that of perception.  
What it feels like to decide whether I hold a certain belief is not what it feels like to see, 
touch or smell something.   
 Thirdly, the kinds of mistakes I make in perception are not the kinds of mistakes I 
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make about my own mental states.  For my mistakes involving perception are usually 
honest.  But my mistakes about my own beliefs and desires always involve an 
irrationality typically found in self-deception.   
 For example, I may come to believe that it is raining because I look out of the 
widow and see falling water that looks just like rain.  But a sprinkler that I cannot see 
produces the falling water.  Or I may come to believe that it is raining because a trick of 
the light generates the illusion of falling water.  In neither case is there anything wrong 
with my faculty of perception.  In the first case but not the second, I really do see what I 
seem to see, namely falling water, but mistake it for rain.  In a third case I may come to 
believe that it is raining because I experience the hallucination of rain that is the result of 
being unwittingly drugged.  In no case am I irrational in mistakenly believing that it is 
raining.  In the first case, my mistake is simply due to my ignorance of the source of the 
falling water.  In the second it is due to my ignorance that conditions of light render my 
apparent perceptions unreliable.  In the third it is due to my ignorance that my faculty of 
perception is malfunctioning. Such ignorance constitutes no irrationality. 
 By contrast, a typical case in which I make a mistake about my own beliefs  
arises when I tell you that I don’t believe that women are inferior.  My assertion may be  
sincere because I am blind to the way I treat women. You may be in a better position to  
recognise that my boorish behaviour is the manifestation of the existence of the belief  
that I sincerely deny having.  This would not be an honest mistake in the same way as my  
honest perceptual mistakes but would reveal a degree to which I am irrational. 
 So we still need an account of what justifies, or counts as a reliable method of 
forming, my beliefs about my own beliefs.  As we noted above, such an account will 
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have to also explain why I am normally the best authority of what beliefs I hold. 
 
3.  Moore’s paradox    
 
G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert 
‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did’ (1942, 543)  
would be ‘absurd’.  Such an assertion is unlike semantically odd Liar-type assertions such 
as ‘What I’m now saying is not true’ since my Moorean assertion might be true: you may 
consistently imagine a situation in which I went to the pictures last Tuesday but fail to 
believe that I did.  Moreover, if you contradict my assertion then your words, ‘If he went 
to the pictures last Tuesday then he believes he did’ do not report a necessary truth2. 
As Moore puts it, what is absurd is for me to assert such sentences. What is paradoxical is 
that this absurdity persists in the absence of semantic contradiction in my words 
themselves, for what I say about myself might be true (Baldwin 1993, 209).  What Moore 
did not appear to notice is that it seems no less absurd of me to silently believe that I went 
to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did3.  So a natural way of resolving 
the paradox is to explain the source of the absurdity, both in assertion and in belief, but 
not in wholly semantic terms. Doing so would locate a contradiction-like phenomenon 
while recognising that no contradiction lies in the meaning of what I have asserted. 
In fact there is a long tradition of attempting to deliver the explanation of the 
absurdity of Moorean assertion in terms of Moorean belief4.  Consistently with this, 
Sidney Shoemaker (1995, note 1, 227), observes that, ‘What can be coherently believed 
constrains what can be coherently asserted but not conversely’.  But since ‘coherently’ is 
ambiguous between ‘consistently’, ‘appropriately’ and ‘rationally’ then Shoemaker’s 
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constraint had better stick with Moore’s own term ‘absurdly’, by which he means 
‘irrationally, either in theory or practice’.  This yields: 
If I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly assert that p.  
 
The failure of the converse of this is supported by the fact that my assertion, ‘I’m 
asserting nothing now’, is unlike Moore’s example.  After all, I could quietly believe in 
my continuing obedience to a Trappist vow of silence without the least absurdity5. 
An important fact still often overlooked in the debate is that Moore also observes 
that to say, ‘I believe that he has gone out, but he has not’ would be likewise ‘absurd’ 
(1944, 204).  Unlike his first example, that has the omissive form  
p & I don’t believe that p,  
this has the comissive6 form,  
p & I believe that not-p7
This semantic difference is inherited from the genuine difference between atheists and 
agnostics. The result is the difference between the specific commission of a mistake in 
belief and the specific omission of true belief. 
So any adequate account of Moorean absurdity must explain the absurdity of 
comissive assertions and beliefs as well as that of omissive assertions and beliefs, in a 
way that obeys Shoemaker’s constraint8.   
In fact Shoemaker proposes an account of Moorean absurdity.  Although the 
account fails, it points us towards a more promising account of self-knowledge that does 
give a satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity.  
 
4. Shoemaker’s account of Moorean belief 
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 Shoemaker attempts to explain the absurdity of Moorean belief in terms of a single self-
contradictory belief, namely a belief of the form p & not-p.  He writes (1995, 213): 
…consider the proposition…expressed by the sentence “It is raining and I don’t believe that it is 
raining, and that this is so (viz., that it is raining and I don’t believe that it is) is something I believe.” 
That is self-contradictory. 
In other words, Shoemaker observes that it is self-contradictory to suppose that I hold a 
true omissive Moorean belief.  This is perfectly true, provided we accept the intuitively 
plausible principle that belief distributes over conjunction. 
 If I believe that (p & q) then I believe that p and I believe that q 
Given this principle, if I believe that (p & I don’t believe that p) then I believe that p, 
which falsifies the second conjunct of what I believe. But this diagnosis does not hold for 
the comissive Moorean belief.  For I may truly believe that (p and I believe that not-p), 
provided I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p.  Moreover seems to be no self-
contradiction in supposing that I do so.  Shoemaker continues (1995, 213): 
So it is a feature of the contents of Moore paradoxical sentences that if they can be believed at all, the 
subject of such a belief could not believe that she had it without believing a contradiction.  
But this fails to follow. In the omissive case, the belief that I think I hold is self-
falsifying.  In the comissive case, the belief that I think I hold is self-falsifying unless I 
hold contradictory beliefs.  In neither case it is obvious that I must hold contradictory 
beliefs, let alone believe a self-contradiction.   
So what else will deliver a self-contradictory belief?  Shoemaker’s answer (1995, 
214, my italics) appears to be a principle of rational belief introduction that 
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... believing something commits one to believing that one believes it, in the sense that in some kind of 
circumstances, yet to be specified, if one believes something, and considers whether one does, one 
must, on pain of irrationality, believe that one believes it.  
Since the normal circumstances Shoemaker has in mind exclude, for instance, bouts of 
temporary amnesia, his principle may be clarified as  
Normally, if I believe that p then I would believe that I believe that p were I to  
 
consider whether I believe that p. 
 
where this is supposed to hold true of me if I am maximally rational.  This principle 
seems entirely plausible.  Moreover it has the advantage of avoiding an infinite regress, 
since there are only a finite number of acts of considering.  
But how will this principle help explain the absurdity of Moorean belief?  
Suppose in the omissive case, that I rationally believe that (p and I don’t believe that p).  
To get any further Shoemaker needs the plausible principle that rational belief distributes 
over conjunction: 
If I rationally believe that (p and q) then I rationally believe that p and I rationally  
 
believe that q.  
 
So I rationally believe that p and I rationally believe that I don’t believe that p.  Now 
Shoemaker’s principle of rational belief introduction may be applied to the first of my 
rational beliefs.  But what this principle really means is that if I rationally believe that p 
then at best, I unconsciously believe that I believe that p until I perform the act of 
consideration, or in other words of reflection, on the question of whether I believe that p.  
So Shoemaker’s principle will yield only the result that I unconsciously believe that I 
believe that p yet also believe that I don’t believe that p9.  In the comissive case, parallel 
reasoning delivers the result that if I rationally believe that (p and I believe that not-p) 
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then I unconsciously believe that I believe that p yet also believe that I believe that not-
p10.  
 But such a diagnosis does not do justice to the pathology of Moorean belief, for 
we can consistently suppose that I have contradictory beliefs because one or other of 
them is unconscious.  A visit to a psychiatrist might unearth my long-repressed belief that 
my mother was an adulterer that persists in the face of my sincere adult assertion that she 
was not. In that case my irrationality seems milder than the pathology of Moorean belief.   
The second problem with Shoemaker’s position is that he explains the absurdity 
of Moorean belief in terms of the truth of his principle of rational belief introduction. I 
falsify that principle just in case I believe that p but I don’t believe that I believe that p.  
If we now substitute ‘q’ for ‘I believe that p’, this becomes an omissive case in which q 
but I don’t believe that q.  The case of self-deception given in §2 shows such that such a 
case is possible.  In other words 
I believe that women are inferior but I don’t think I believe they are   
Now suppose that I acquire the true belief that this is so.  I now have an omissive 
Moorean belief the absurdity of which cannot be explained in terms of the truth of 
Shoemaker’s principle.  
Nor could Shoemaker adequately explain the absurdity in terms of the falsehood 
of his principle.  Even if I am irrational in being unable to recognise my own prejudiced 
conviction that women are inferior, this is not the deeper contradiction-like irrationality 
of Moorean belief. 
 
 
 10
5. Evans’ Principle 
 
In The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans observes (1982, 225-6) 
If someone asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’ I must attend, in 
answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering 
the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’  I get myself in a position to answer the question 
whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the 
question whether p ... We can encapsulate this procedure for answering questions about what one 
believes in the following simple rule: whenever you are in a position to assert that p, you are ipso 
facto in a position to assert ‘I believe that p’  
The possibility of lies shows that my assertion that p need not be sincere. So Evans’ rule 
may be clarified as the fact that whenever I am in a position to sincerely assert that p then 
I am in a position to sincerely assert that I believe that p.  What follows from this is 
Evans’ principle that  
Whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I 
believe that p. 
Although Evans provides no argument for his rule it is highly plausible.  For if you ask 
me whether I think that it is raining, I will normally treat this question as the question, ‘Is 
it raining?’  So any justification I have for a sincere answer to the question of whether p 
will be precisely the same justification for a sincere answer to the question of whether I 
believe that p.   If the question, ‘Is it the case that p?’ were semantically equivalent to the 
question, ‘Is it the case that you believe that p?’ then Evans’ principle would follow, 
because whatever justifies me in giving a sincere answer to the one would justify me in 
giving a sincere answer to the other.  But obviously questions of these two forms are 
semantically distinct, because only the second is always a question about my beliefs.  In 
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other words, there is no semantic contradiction in answering yes to the first and no to the 
second or in answering no to the first and yes to the second.  Indeed my giving the first 
set of answers would consist in making an omissive Moorean assertion, and my giving 
the second set of answers would consist in making a comissive Moorean assertion.    
However it does seem true that in most pragmatic contexts the two questions are treated 
interchangeably.  But not in all contexts.  For example, if you ask me whether the pubs 
are still open, I may reply, ‘I think so, but don’t quote me’.  Since you are interested in 
getting to the pubs rather than the state of my beliefs, you would not take this answer as a 
yes to the question, ‘Are the pubs still open?’  However there is very simple and 
compelling argument for Evans’ principle that would appeal to a causal theorist: 
Circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that 
 
tend to make me believe that p. 
 
 
Circumstances that tend to make it the case that p are circumstances in which I am  
 
justified in believing that p. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Circumstances that justify me in believing that it is raining are circumstances that 
justify me in believing that I believe that p. 
 
This argument is valid.  For if we substitute ‘I believe that p’ for ‘p’ in the second 
premise then it becomes 
 
Circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that 
 
tend to make me believe that p. 
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Circumstances that tend to make it the case that I believe that p are circumstances  
 
in which I am justified in believing that I believe that p. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that justify me 
in believing that I believe that p. 
 
Moreover both premises of the original argument are independently appealing.  Taken 
conjointly, they tell us that circumstances are those that justify me in believing that p just 
in case they are circumstances that tend to make me believe that p.  This is precisely what 
a causal account of justified belief would say.  For example, my apparent perceptions of 
rain tend to make me believe that it is raining.  This is the sense in which ‘seeing is 
believing’.  And given that my apparent perceptions of rain are generally reliable, my 
apparent perceptions of rain justify me in thinking that it is raining.  So my apparent 
perception of rain justifies both my belief that it is raining and my belief that I believe 
that it is raining in virtue of different sets of reliable connections.  I am justified in 
believing that it is raining on the basis of seeming to see rain because seeming to see rain 
is reliably connected with the occurrence of rain.  And the very same basis of seeming to 
see rain justifies me in thinking that I believe that it is raining because seeming to see rain 
is reliably connected with my coming to believe that it is raining.   
 It should be clear enough that this argument would hold for any form of 
justification.  For example, if my seeming to remember that it rained yesterday justifies 
me in thinking that it indeed rained yesterday then that is because my apparent memories 
are generally reliable.  And the very same basis of seeming to remember that it rained 
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yesterday justifies me in thinking that I believe that it is raining because seeming to 
remember that it rained yesterday is reliably connected with my coming to believe that it 
rained yesterday. 
 We now have a perfectly non-mysterious alternative to the introspective account 
of what justifies my beliefs about my own beliefs, namely that it is precisely whatever 
justifies that first-order belief itself, whether it is perception, memory, deductive 
inference or even inductive inference from observation of behaviour.  
 Evan better, the account also explains why I am normally the best authority on my 
own beliefs.  Suppose that you and I are both standing at the window looking at the 
weather. In deciding whether I believe that it is raining I simply decide whether it is 
raining.  I may justifiably decide this on the basis of my apparent perception of rain.  But 
your apparent perception of rain will not justify you in thinking that I believe that it 
raining. For you to decide whether I believe that it is raining, you need to observe my 
verbal and non-verbal behaviour (as when I unfurl my umbrella or say ‘It’s raining’) and 
then make an inference to my belief that counts as the best explanation of my behaviour.  
Alternatively, you may observe me observing the rain and then infer by analogy that 
since you have come to believe that it is raining then so have I.  In either case you are 
liable to mistakes in observation.  In the first case you may mistake my tendency to play 
with my umbrella as a sign of concern about the weather or mistake my question ‘It’s 
raining?’ as my bona fide assertion of rain.   In the second case you may mistake falling 
water as rain or mistake my daydreaming at the window as a reliable indication of my 
observation of weather.    
 By contrast, I need only observe the state of the weather.  Nor do I need to make 
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any inference at all.  So you are liable to error in ways that I am not.  Of course it is still 
true that I too may mistake falling water for rain.  But in the second case that mistake 
would not undermine my justification for correctly ascribing myself the belief, admittedly 
mistaken, that it is raining.    
 
6. Back to Self-Knowledge 
 
This account of the way my second-order beliefs are justified helps explain how I come 
to know my own beliefs.  For it turns out that whenever I come to know that p then I also 
tend to come to believe that I know that p. From an internalist point of view, I know that 
p just in case I have a justified true belief that p.  So the normal case in which I come to 
know that it is raining by observing the weather through the window will be a case in 
which I acquire the true belief that it is raining that is justified by my seeming to see rain.   
In this case I will tend to also acquire a justified true belief that I believe that it is raining 
and so will also tend to come to know that I believe that it is raining. 
 From an externalist point of view, I know that p just in case I have a truth-
tracking belief that p. So the normal case in which I come to know that it is raining by 
observing the weather through the window will be a case in which I acquire the true 
belief that it is raining such that had it not been raining then I would not have come to 
believe that it is raining.  In this case I will also tend to acquire the true belief that I 
believe that it is raining.  Since the genesis of my belief that it is raining is actually the 
same as that of my belief that I now hold that belief, namely my apparent perception of 
rain, it follows that had I not come to believe that it is raining then I would not have come 
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to believe that I believe that it is raining.  So again I will tend to come to know that I 
believe that it is raining.  In the causal variant of this account, I know that p just in case 
whatever makes it the case that p tends (together with background factors such as my 
reliable perception) to make me believe that p.  So the normal case in which I come to 
know that it is raining by observing the weather through the window will be a case in 
which what makes it rain (namely the falling of water from clouds) together with my 
reliable eyesight, is what tends to make me think that it is raining.  In this case I will tend 
to acquire the true belief that I believe that it is raining that is again caused by the falling 
of water from clouds together with my reliable eyesight.  So again I will tend to come to 
know that it is raining. 
 This account is consistent with the fact that I may sometimes adopt your methods 
of justifiably ascribing beliefs to me.  To return to a previous example, after your therapy 
on how to treat women, I might start to observe my non-verbal behaviour towards women 
and so discover my repressed belief that women are inferior. There would be nothing 
irrational in adopting this method, since this discovery would represent a useful insight 
into my lack of self-knowledge.  But that insight could only be useful if it led me to 
revise my beliefs in a way that is an overall improvement in my rationality and 
consequently, my public behaviour.  Before the insight, I believed that women were 
inferior but did not believe that I held this belief.  The most likely explanation of my self-
blindness was that there is no justification for my prejudice against women.  For had 
justification been available to me for believing that women are inferior then that same 
justification would have been available to me for thinking that I hold the belief that 
women are inferior.  But now that I have recognised that I do hold that belief, I should 
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look for justification for it.  Finding none available, I should abandon my prejudice.  Of 
course if I were always incapable of acting on Evans’ rule then I would be deeply 
irrational.  For then I would have to constantly employ third-person therapeutic methods.  
This would mean foregoing a first-person method of obtaining a justifiable view of my 
own cognition that enjoys best authority because it is less immune to the kinds of 
mistakes a therapist could make. 
 
7.  The solution to Moore’s paradox in belief 
 
One highly plausible principle is  
 
Whatever justifies me in believing that (p & q) justifies me in believing that p and 
justifies me in believing that q.    
This is similar to the principle that Shoemaker needs to explain the absurdity of Moorean 
belief – that rational belief distributes over conjunction.  Surely if my apparent perception 
of hot and humid weather justifies me in believing that it is hot and humid then that same 
apparent perception justifies me in believing that it is hot and also justifies me in 
believing that it is humid.   
 Now suppose that I believe that (it is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining). 
Suppose too that I have justification for believing this.  Then given the conjunctive 
principle above, I have justification for believing that it is raining.  According to Evans’ 
principle, this means that I enjoy the same justification for believing that I believe that it 
is raining.  But by the conjunctive principle, I also enjoy precisely the same justification 
for believing that I don’t believe that it is raining.  This is logically impossible, because 
anything that justifies me in believing that something is the case (in this case that I 
 17
believe that it is raining) renders me unjustified in believing that it is not the case (in this 
case that I don’t believe that it is raining) and visa versa11.  So it is impossible for me to 
enjoy any justification for holding an omissive belief of the form p & I don’t believe that 
p12.  I am guilty of a severe contradiction-like irrationality in holding such a belief, 
despite the fact that what I believe might be true of me.  Moreover although the bare truth 
of what I believe (namely that I have failed to believe a specific truth about rain) 
constitutes no irrationality in me, to believe that I am guilty of that specific failure is 
indeed irrational unless it leads me to revise my beliefs.  The natural way to do so would 
be to given up my belief that I don’t believe that it is raining. 
 But how will such an account explain my absurdity holding the comissive belief 
that (it is raining but I believe that it is not raining)?   Suppose again that I have 
justification for believing this.  The conjunctive principle shows that I have justification 
for believing that it is raining and have the same justification for believing that I believe 
that it is not raining.  But Evans’ principle will not turn this into an absurd case in which I 
hold the same justification for each of a pair of contradictory meta-beliefs. What is 
needed is the different principle that 
Whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I don’t  
 
believe that not-p.  
 
This new principle is independently plausible.  Surely if my apparent perception of rain 
justifies me in thinking that it is raining, then it also justifies me in thinking that I don’t 
hold the belief that it is not raining.  Moreover it follows from Evans’ principle, together 
with the assumption that I am minimally rational and reflective.  If I am at all rational 
then I will recognise the fact that whatever justification I have for believing that p renders 
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me unjustified in believing that not-p.  By Evans’ principle, whatever justification I have 
for believing that p is justification for taking myself to believe that I believe that p.   But 
if I take myself to enjoy justification for holding the belief that p and recognise that this 
justification renders me unjustified in believing that not-p then I should take myself as 
not believing that not-p.    
 Now suppose that as a minimally reflective and rational person, I am justified in 
believing that (It is raining but I don’t believe that it is raining). Then given the 
conjunctive principle, I again have justification for believing that it is raining.  According 
to the new principle, this means that I enjoy the same justification for believing that I 
don’t believe that it is not raining.  But by the conjunctive principle, I also enjoy precisely 
the same justification for believing that I do believe that it is not raining.  This is logically 
impossible, because I cannot enjoy the same justification for holding both of a pair of 
contradictory beliefs13.  So it is impossible for me to enjoy any justification for holding a 
comissive belief of the form p & I believe that not-p.  Although the bare truth of what I 
believe (namely that I have made a specific mistake about rain) constitutes no 
irrationality in me, to believe that I am guilty of that specific failure is indeed irrational 
unless it leads me to revise my beliefs.  The natural way to do so would be to give up my 
mistaken belief that I believe that it is not raining. 
 From an internalist view of knowledge, the fact that I can enjoy no justification 
for an omissive or comissive Moorean belief means that I cannot know what I believe 
either.  It is hardly surprising that I cannot know that I now fail to believe a specific truth 
or know that I now hold a specific false belief.  From an externalist view of knowledge, 
the same result follows from the fact that there can be no truth-tracking or reliable 
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method of forming Moorean beliefs.  An alternative route to the same conclusion is 
provided by the principle that knowledge distributes over conjunction: 
If I know that (p & q) then I know that p and I know that q 
Any account of knowledge accepts two other principles, namely the facticity of 
knowledge: 
 If I know that p then p 
and the doxacity of knowledge:   
If I know that p then I believe that p.  
Now suppose that I know that (p & I don’t believe that p).  Since knowledge distributes 
over conjunction, I know that I don’t believe that p, in which case the facticity of 
knowledge ensures that I don’t believe that p.  But the doxacity of knowledge shows this 
is impossible, since I also know that p.  In the comissive case, the logical impossibility of 
my knowing that (p & I believe that not-p) can be likewise demonstrated just in case we 
grant that knowledge excludes belief in falsehood: 
If I know that p then I don’t believe that not-p.  
But having granted the doxacity of knowledge we must grant this new principle as well. 
Otherwise we would allow the possibility that I know that p while holding contradictory 
beliefs about whether p. Since this makes my belief that p unjustified or non-truth-
tracking, it could not be part of my knowledge that p.  
 
8.  The solution to Moore’s paradox in assertion  
 
What remains is to explain the absurdity of omissive and comissive Moorean assertions 
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in line with Shoemaker’s constraint.  One popular way of meeting that constraint is 
derive the absurdity of Moorean assertion from that of Moorean belief by means of the 
idea that assertion ‘expresses’ beliefs.  Unfortunately, this sense of ‘express’ is seldom 
elucidated. Is the verb to be used factively, like ‘know’ or ‘recognise’?  Is it to be used as 
containing an intention, like ‘shoot’ or ‘warn’?  Used factively, ‘I expressed a belief I 
didn’t hold’ would be a self-contradiction in the same way as ‘I expressed milk from my 
empty breast’14. On the other hand there seems to be a non-factive sense.  For example in 
response to your offer to show me your holiday snapshots for the umpteenth time, there is 
a sense in which I may express an interest I don’t have. Used as containing intentions, “I 
expressed my belief that Bush is mad by muttering ‘Bush is mad’ in my sleep” would be 
a self-contradiction in the same way as ‘I warned him, while asleep, that the snows are 
treacherous this year’.  Since this already gives us four possible senses of ‘express a 
belief’ it would be sensible to identify which one is intended15. 
 As Thomas Baldwin (1990, 228) points out, your knowledge that I’m telling you 
a lie when I make the Moorean assertion to you will not expunge my absurdity. Indeed as 
Rosenthal notes (1995a, 203), nor will any other context of communication.  Just as your 
knowledge that I am lying to you when I make a Moorean assertion does nothing to 
expunge the absurdity, so your knowledge that I’m reminding you, misinforming you, 
confessing to you or announcing to you, does nothing to expunge it either. So insincere 
Moorean assertions, notably Moorean lies, will have to be located within the messy 
business of expression.  One natural way to describe a liar is as someone who expresses a 
belief he doesn’t hold, so the two factive senses of ‘express’ appear to prevent liars from 
making assertions. But this would mean that liars couldn’t tell even a lie.  Some 
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commentators respond by heroically denying that lies are genuine assertions but are 
rather bits of play-acting (Rosenthal 1995a, footnote 15, 208).  But then it would follow 
that I could refute the accusation that I have told you a lie by merely admitting that I was 
lying, for then I could not have told you anything.   Austin (1970, 69-71) is similarly 
heroic in holding that if I insincerely say ‘I promise,’ I don’t strictly speaking promise, 
but only say I do.  If this were true then it would make a mockery of justice. For then I 
could conveniently escape from a contractual ‘promise’ by just admitting my insincerity.  
 This difficulty should make us consider whether we may sidestep the notion of 
expression entirely.   One strategy for doing so is to first explain the absurdity of 
Moorean belief and then give a speech-act account of the absurdity of Moorean assertion 
in terms of the assertor’s necessarily frustrated intentions.  One version of this goes as 
follows: 
When I make a Moorean assertion to you, no absurdity arises if you merely 
believe that my words are true.  For you can quite sensibly believe that I am ignorant in a 
specific way or that I hold a specific mistaken belief.  But with two harmless exceptions 
that I will discuss in the next section, my full intention in making an assertion to you is 
not simply to get you to believe my words. In attempting to inform or let you know that 
p, I intend to get you to know that p.  When I lie to you that p, I intend to get you to 
mistakenly believe that p.  In any such case I intend to get you to believe my words.   But 
I cannot succeed in this attempt unless I also get you to think that I am sincere in making 
the assertion. For if you think that I’m play-acting or recognise that I’m lying then you 
have no reason to accept my words, so my attempt to impart knowledge or lie to you will 
fail.  Since I should see with minimal reflection that this is so, my full intention must be 
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to get you to believe my words by getting you to think me sincere in uttering them. It 
follows that I must intend to get you to believe that I am sincerely telling the truth.  In 
other words, we might stipulate or argue that I aim to make you believe me.   
  When my assertion is Moorean this aim is necessarily frustrated. It seems 
uncontroversial that assertion distributes over conjunction: 
  If I assert that (p and q) then I assert that p and I assert that q 
So if I tell you that (p and I don’t believe that p) then I tell you that p.  So in virtue of 
believing me sincere, you must think that I believe that p.  But given the same principle, I 
also tell you that I don’t believe that p.  So in virtue of believing that I tell the truth, you 
must think that I don’t believe that p.  So you must have contradictory beliefs if you 
believe me.   
  In the comissive assertion, if I tell you that (p and I don’t believe that p) then 
since assertion distributes over conjunction, I tell you that p.  So in virtue of believing me 
sincere, you must again think that I believe that p.  But I also tell you that I believe that 
not-p.  So in virtue of believing that I tell the truth, you must think that I believe that not- 
p.  So this time you must think that I have contradictory beliefs.   
 So you cannot believe me in either case without thinking me theoretically 
irrational or being so yourself.  Since I should assume that we would both charitably 
avoid ascriptions of such irrationality if possible, I am in position to see with minimal 
reflection in either case that my plan to be believed is bound to fail.  Accordingly I should 
revise my plans.  If I don’t then I’m practically irrational.  
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9.  Neutralising two objections 
 
I now anticipate two objections.  The first is that there are two types of assertion that do 
not fit the central account just given.  For if I make either type of assertion to you, I do 
not aim to make you think I am sincerely telling the truth.  The first case is when I say 
something to you merely in order to ‘wind you up’. For example, suppose that I know 
that you think highly of Bush’s intelligence, an opinion I in fact share.  Nonetheless I 
insincerely state that Bush is a moron in order to ‘rattle your cage’.  Here my intention is 
to ensure you remain verbally opposed to my words by accepting my sincerity.  
  The second case arises when on learning that you have just discovered that I am a 
habitual liar, I decide to tell the truth for once.  So when you ask me if the pubs are still 
open, I tell you the truth that they are, in order to deceive you into mistakenly thinking 
that they are not.  Here my intention is to get you to believe that my words are false by 
rejecting my sincerity.  
However both examples are accommodated by the central account.  In the first 
example, I can hardly hope to prolong verbal disagreement with you unless you think 
(mistakenly) that I’m sincere.  But I am in position to see that you couldn’t take me to 
hold a Moorean belief unless you thought I was irrational.   
Since part of my aim in making a Moorean assertion is to convince you of my 
sincerity, in making a Moorean assertion I aim to get you to attribute a Moorean belief to 
me.  If I succeed in this aim, you will be a position to see that I can enjoy no justification 
for that belief, as explained in §7.  In other words, you may only think me sincere in my 
assertion if you judge me to be theoretically irrational.  Since I am in a position to work 
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this out, I should realise on minimal reflection that the point of my assertion will not 
succeed.  So if I persist in the assertion then I am practically irrational.   
This satisfies Shoemaker’s constraint. Another satisfactory point to note about 
Shoemaker’s account is that what I believe in any sincere Moorean assertion is identical 
to what you must believe if you believe me to be sincerely telling the truth.  For given a 
new but plausible principle that belief distributes over conjunction: 
  If I believe that (p & q) then I believe that p and I believe that q 
in believing that (p & I don’t believe that p) then I believe that p.  But if what I believe is 
true then I don’t believe that p.  This is a self-contradiction or logically impossibility. In 
the comissive case, if I believe that (p & I believe that not-p) then I again believe that p.  
But if what I believe is true then I believe that p.  So I hold contradictory beliefs. 
In the second example, my intention in asserting that p is to get you to mistakenly 
believe that not-p.  But this means that I myself believe that p.  But we have already seen 
that when my assertion is Moorean, I cannot justifiably believe what I assert.  Moreover, 
my attempt to make you think me insincere is parasitic upon my expectation that you will 
normally think me sincere.  After all, such an assertion is a double bluff.  So the full 
description of such an assertion includes the fact that when I thus assert to you that p I 
intend to get you to mistakenly believe that I’m insincere because I know that normally I 
will get you to think I’m sincere.  But when my assertion is Moorean, this is bound to fail, 
because there is no normal case in which I can sensibly try to make you think I hold a 
Moorean belief.   
The second objection I anticipate is that I am not necessarily guilty of practical 
irrationality in making an assertion when I know that I will not be believed. For I 
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might feel sure, under your interrogation, that you think me guilty, and yet protest, ‘I’m 
damn well innocent I tell you’ in the knowledge that you won’t change your mind.   
But my assertion may have different points and may be directed at different 
audiences.  This disarms the objection.  Suppose that after an hour of protesting, I realise 
that you will never accept my innocence.  Surely it would be pointless to persist in 
attempting to make you accept my innocence by accepting my sincerity because I would 
be trying to do something I know will fail.  Instead I might sensibly repeat the protest but 
with the different intention of merely making you think I’m sincere.  If I know I really am 
guilty I might be feigning sincerity to get away with a lighter sentence, so that you say 
afterwards, ‘He's still guilty all right, but the poor chap really believes he didn't assault 
that publican. He must have been really drunk’.  But if I now realise that you will punish 
me for my guilt regardless of any misguided sincerity on my part or see that you will 
never revise your verdict that I'm telling a lie then there is again no point in my 
assertions.  The sensible thing to do is to save my breath.   
Now suppose that I continue to protest my innocence for the sake of a camera that 
I know is recording the interrogation. My assertion now has the different point of 
convincing relevant persons who might watch the tape of my innocence, or failing that, at 
least of my sincerity.  If I now learn that all who will watch the tape are just as stony as 
you then surely the assertion would have no rational point, since we have now effectively 
removed any potentially responsive audience from the picture. Unless I now I stick my 
head out of the cell window and shout ‘I'm innocent!’ in the hope of imparting this 
information to any stray passer-by, continuing to proclaim my innocence would be like 
talking aloud to myself.  This would require an irrationally divided self in which one self 
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reminds or convinces the other self of the first self's innocence.  On the other hand my 
point in repeating to myself, ‘I'm innocent’ might be not to make an assertion at all, but 
merely to keep my spirits up or to exercise my lungs. In such a case my utterances are 
more like inspirational songs than bona fide assertions. 
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Notes 
 
1.  The past participle of introspicere means ‘to look inside’. 
 
 
2.  In parsing your ‘Either it is not raining or he believes that it is raining’ as ‘If it is  
raining then he believes that it is raining’ I take ‘if’ as implication.  Although such 
an inference is generally invalid, most would allow it here.  For example, 
Stalnaker 1975 and 1984 would allow it on pragmatic grounds because you don’t 
know which disjunct is true. If we symbolise ‘I believe that p’ as ‘Bp’ we have 
the following proof: 
1. ~(p & ~Bp)  Suppose the falsehood of Moorean assertion 
2. ~p v ~~Bp  De Morgan’s Law 
3. ~p v Bp  ~~ elim 
4. p → Bp  → equivalence 
 
3. Sorensen (1988, 16-56) is probably the first commentator to consider the nature of 
Moorean belief.  Until then only the absurdity of Moorean assertion was 
considered, initially as a pragmatic paradox in speech acts.  Since then xxxx, 
xxxx, xxxx, Baldwin 1990, Heal 1994, Rosenthal 1995a, 1995b and Shoemaker 
1995 have discussed it. 
 
 
4. Sorensen (1988, 39) is probably the first to attempt this strategy by simply 
observing that a Moorean assertor appears to be a Moorean believer.  But this 
calls for an explanation of why appearing to hold such a belief makes me absurd. 
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 Others in this tradition include Wittgenstein (1980, §472), Heal (1994, 22), Hájek 
and Stoljar (2001), xxxx, xxxx and Rosenthal (1995a, 197, 199 and 1995b, 317-
319). 
 
5. In contradiction of Rosenthal’s claim (2002, 167) that ‘Moore’s paradox occurs 
with sentences… which are self-defeating in a way that prevents one from making 
an assertion with them’. 
 
6.  Sorensen coins these useful terms in (1988, 16). 
 
7. This difference in formalism is disguised by Moore’s examples.  This is one 
reason to think that Moore himself did not see the difference.  If we formalise “I 
went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did” as ‘p & ~Bp’ then 
“I believe that he has gone out, but he has not” becomes ‘Bp & ~p’. By 
commutation this yields ‘~p & Bp’.  To achieve canonical reference to belief this 
may be represented as ‘p & B~p’.  
 
8. Some recent accounts run afoul of the distinction between omissive and comissive 
absurdity.  For example, Rosenthal’s diagnosis (2002, 171) that a Moorean 
sentence denies the occurrence of the intentional state that it also purports to 
express, fails to explain the omissive assertion in which I deny nothing but rather 
affirm a belief.  By contrast Hájeck and Stoljar’s (2001, 209) diagnosis of the 
absurdity of omissive Moorean assertion, that I express contradictory beliefs 
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(because I assert that p and so express a belief that p and also assert that I believe 
that not-p and so express a belief that not-p) does not apply to the comissive 
assertion. 
 
9. Using ‘Brp’ to denote ‘I rationally believe that p’, given 
 SP) Brp → BBp   Shoemaker’s Principle 
   Br&) Br (p & q) → (Brp & Brq) Rational belief distributes over conjunction 
 
 1. Br (p & ~Bp)  Suppose rational omissive belief 
 2. Br p & Br ~Bp  1, Br& 
 3. Br p   2, &-elim 
 4. Br ~Bp   2, &-elim 
 5. BBp   3, SP 
 6. BBp & Br ~Bp  2,6, &-intro.  Contradictory beliefs 
 
10. Given  
 SP) Brp → BBp   Shoemaker’s Principle 
   Br&) Br (p & q) → (Brp & Brq) Rational belief distributes over conjunction 
 
 1. Br (p & B~p)  Suppose rational comissive belief 
 2. Br p & Br B~p  1, Br& 
 3. Br p   2, &-elim 
 4. Br B~p   2, &-elim 
 30
 5. BBp   3, SP 
 6. BBp & Br B~p  2, 6 &-intro.   
 
11. Likewise from an externalist point of view, any truth-tracking or reliable method 
of acquiring the belief that p will be a non-truth-tracking or unreliable method of 
acquiring the belief that not-p and visa versa. 
 
 12. Using ‘Bjp’ to denote ‘I am justified in believing that p’, given 
A) Bj (p & q) → (Bjp & Bjq) Justification for belief  
distributes over conjunction 
 
B)  Bj p  → BjBp   Evans’ principle 
C) Bjp → ~ Bj~p   Impossibility of justified  
contradictory beliefs 
 
1. Bj (p & ~Bp)  Suppose justification for omissive Moorean 
belief.  
2. Bj p & Bj ~Bp  1, A. 
3. Bj ~Bp   2, &-elim. 
4. Bj p   2, &-elim. 
5. BjBp   4, B 
6. ~Bj~Bp   5, C 
7.   Bj ~Bp & ~Bj~Bp 5, 6, &-intro.  Contradiction. 
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13. Given 
 
A) Bj (p & q) → (Bjp & Bjq)  Justification for belief distributes  
over conjunction 
 
 D)  Bj p  → Bj~B~p       Corollary of Evans’ principle 
 
C) Bjp → ~ Bj~p    Impossibility of justified  
contradictory beliefs 
 
 1.  Bj (p & B~p)  Suppose justification for comissive Moorean  
belief 
 
2. Bj p & Bj B~p  1, A 
3.  Bj B~p   2, &-elim 
4.  Bj p   2, &-elim 
5.  Bj~B~p  4, D 
6.  ~Bj~B~p   3, C 
    7. Bj~B~p & ~Bj~B~p 5, 6, &-intro.  Contradiction. 
 
14. The Latin root of the verb ‘express’ is ‘press out’ 
 
15. Rosenthal (1995a, 198) uses ‘express’ in a way that ignores intentions, whereas  
most other commentators distinguish between expressing a belief and 
unintentionally manifesting or betraying it. Xxxx is one of the few that have used 
‘express’ non-factively. Another exception is Searle (1983, 9) who observes that  
‘…in the performance of each illusionary act with a propositional content, we express a 
certain International state with that propositional content, and that Intentional state is the 
sincerity condition of that type of speech act’.   
For Searle, one can express intentional states without being in them. 
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